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Based on the lessons learned from the Falkland War, an airborne early warning 
(AEW) system's importance is fully appreciated, and many countries field the AEW 
system to be a force multiplier for their air defense system. In this thesis, the AEW 
system's vulnerability, the sensitivity of each factor dominating the AEW system's 
detection range under hostile jamming, and the effect of stand-off noise jamming (SOJ) 
impacting the AEW system's detection range are evaluated using a simulation model to 
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A. OBJECTIVES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Based on lessons learned from the Falkland War (1982), the Bekaa Valley 
Conflict (1982) and the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), the importance of Airborne Early 
W aming (AEW) systems have been confirmed. On the other hand, this mobile airborne 
radar surveillance system is, like any other electronic system, also subject to electronic 
attack (EA), previously called electronic countermeasures (ECM), and this thesis 
investigates the vulnerability of such systems. 
In this thesis, a simulation model is used to determine the vulnerability of an 
AEW system, the sensitivity of each factor dominating the AEW system's detection range 
under hostile jamming, and the effect of stand-off noise jamming (SOJ) impacting the 
AEW system's detection range. 
Related electronic attack operation tactics, jamming techniques, AEW systems' 
features, and electronic protection (EP), previously called electronic counter-counter 
measures (ECCM), characteristics are described for synthesizing simulation scenarios. 
Different penetrating patterns are set to identify the degradation of the AEW' s detection 
range performance in a realistic combat environment. 
The term AEW, as used in this thesis, describes an airborne surveillance system 
with the function of locating air targets at long range. Some of the hypothetical 
parameters used in the simulation model were provided by Grumman Aircraft Company, 
the manufacturer of the E-2C Hawkeye. The simulation results provided in this thesis 
represent general AEW capabilities, and are not intended to represent those of the E2-C. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of SOJ on the performance of 
an AEW system. This is achieved through the use of a simulation. The simulation model 
reveals that SOJ is capable of impeding an AEW system's detection range significantly. 
If the AEW system is not equipped with enough sidelobe cancellers (SLC), the 
degradation problem will jeopardize the AEW system's ability to fulfill its mission. The 
number of sidelobe cancellers that can be installed in an AEW system is highly restricted 
by limited space (even large ground and fighting ship systems, such as the Patriot deploy 
only five SLC arrays; and Aegis class cruiser carries only six SLC arrays) (Schieber, 
1986). The SOJ system is supposed to jam the victim radar from the sKlelobes. 
Mainlobe jamming can occur, however, if the SOJ is aligned with the victim radar's 
mainlobe. A well-planned SOJ operation will address issues of placement and 
availability (quantity) of equipment, so that a corridor can be created in the AEW system 
fo~ the ingress of a strike force. 
B. AEW SYSTEM BACKGROUND 
In 1945, the US Navy first placed an AN/ APS-20 radar in the TBM-3W Avenger 
(a torpedo bomber designed by Grumman) in order to compliment ground-based air 
search radars' capabilities in detecting distant fast moving, low-altitude airborne targets. 
The AEW system provides additional capabilities by detecting targets shielded by eartF.. 
surface curvature masking. 
Ground-based radar systems can detect and track airborne targets in medium and 
high altitudes. Distant low-altitude aircraft, however, are masked by the terrain, 
preventing them from being detected. On the other hand, an AEW is primarily designed 
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to detect airborne targets at all altitudes. As a secondary mission, it is also capable of 
detecting maritime ships and ground targets through strong surface clutter. 
During the Persian Gulf War, AEW systems were proven to be an indispensable 
force multiplier. The United States Air Force (USAF) E-3 Sentry flew more than 400 
missions and logged over 5,000 hours of on-station time conducting surveillance and 
command and control missions for nearly 120,000 coalition sorties. In addition, the E-3 
controllers assisted in 38 of 40 air-to-air kills recorded during the air campaign. (US Air 
Force, 1992) 
The US Navy's E-2C directed both combat air patrol (CAP) and laad attack 
missions over the Kuwaiti and Iraqi theaters. The E-2C also provided real-time 
information to air operations commanders, helping them to gain and maintain control of 
the air. The E-2C guided fighters to intercept Iraqi combat aircraft and resulted in the 
downing of two Iraqi MiG-21 fighters in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO). (US 
Navy, 1992) 
By contrast, the Falkland Islands War demonstrated how a military situation can 
deteriorate in the absence of AEW support. The United Kingdom's (UK) naval task 
force, led by the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible, was unable to obtain badly needed 
battlefield sur.reillance information, resulting in heavy losses from joint air attacks by the 
Argentine Air Force (using the A-4 Skyhawk) and Navy (using the Super Etendard). Both 
the A:4 and the Super Etendard flew at low altitude (a "sea-skimming" approach) to 
avoid being detected by surface-based early warning radar. These tactics were effective 
in retarding the British air defense response, leading to the sinking of the Sheffield, 
Atlantic Conveyor, Ardent, and several other ships. 
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In recent years, more and more countries are using AEW systems to enhance their 
early warning and surveillance capabilities. Countering the AEW system has become a 
practical issue that must be resolved before formulating any air penetration strike plan. 
Basically the AEW system is a mobile radar system loitering in the sky, so any EA 
technique, whether ground or airborne, affects the AEW system. 
A commonly used EA tactic is to employ stand-off noise jamming (SOJ) to 
saturate or deceive the AEW system. SOJ generally operates through the AEW system's 
sidelobes in order to mask the attack echelons penetrating into target areas, but is also 
effective in the main beam of an AEW system. 
For the purpose of increasing the operational survivability and effectiveness, in 
addition to minimizing susceptibility, the AEW system uses various EP techniques, such 
as ultra-low/low sidelobe antenna, sidelobe blanker, sidelobe canceller, adaptive phased 
array antenna, frequency/PRF agility, and burnthrough mode, to prevent SOJ from 
degrading its detection ability. 
In the following chapters, different EA and EP techniques are discussed and 
analyzed to explore the vulnerability of the AEW system from the SOJ system. 
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II. AEW SYSTEM VERSUS STAND-OFF JAMMING (SOJ) 
SYSTEM 
A. FEATURES OF STAND-OFF JAMMING (SOJ) 
1. Electronic Attack (EA) Operational Tactics Selection 
The four basic options for EA operational tactics are: 
• Stand-forwardjamming 
• Escort jamming 
• Self-screening jamming (SSJ) 
• Stand-off jamming (SOJ) 
a) Stand-forward Jamming 
In stand-forward jamming, the jammer is deployed in front of the attack 
echelon to jam the enemy's search and tracking radar for the purpose of covering a 
follow-on attack. Unfortunately, the jammer has to fly fast enough to keep a leading 
position ahead of the attack echelon. This results in a reduced payload (lesser and smaller 
jammers in most cases)so that the jammer is forced to jam the victim radar from the 
mainlobe (needs lower effective radiated energy (ERP)), and also must carry a deceptive 
EA jammer (lighter weight) for self-protection. 
Under the above mentioned limitations, the jammer is detected by the 
enemy's radar (jamming an enemy radar from the mainlobe generates a strobe which 
reveals the jammer's azimuth position), causing the jammer to fall into the surface-to-air 
missile's (SAM) lethal coverage area. In the event that the jammer is destroyed, the 
whole strike force would be exposed to the enemy's air defense systems. 
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b) Escort Jamming 
In escort jamming, the jammer accompanies the attack echelon into the 
target area through the entire mission. Accordingly, the escort jammer has the same 
limitations and vulnerability as stand-forward jamming, but is more effective, due to the 
proximity of the jammer to the attack echelon. 
Usually, the escort jammer focuses its attention on the enemy's acquisition 
radar to screen the strike aircraft from SAM systems by denying acquisition. Basically, 
the jammer goes with the strike force in close formation and attempts to jam enemy radar 
with mainlobe and sidelobe jamming. 
From an operational survivability point of view, both the jammer and the 
attack element are highly vulnerable. In addition, the jammer's capabilities may be 
curtailed due to payload limitation, which will jeopardize the whole task force in a high 
density threat environment (multi-layer-deployed air defense networks). 
c) Self-screening Jamming (SSJ) 
A self-screening jammer is carried by the strike aircraft while conducting 
penetration strike, interdiction, close air support (CAS) and suppression of enemy air 
defense (SEAD) missions. The function of SSJ is to protect the strike aircraft from being 
acquired and tracked by enemy terminal defense systems. 
SSJ system must be able to handle multiple threats simultaneously against 
most lethal point defense systems like surface-to-air missile (SAM) and radar guided anti-
aircraft artillery (AAA) in a widely spread electromagnetic (EM) spectrum (probably 
from 70 MHz to 20 GHz). (Schieber, 1986) 
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It is impractical for a tactical fighter-bomber to cany enough transmitters 
to jam all potential threats or to cany jamming power with enough frequency range to 
cover the potential threats' EM spectrum. The only solution is to use deceptive jamming 
directed at the victim radar's mainlobe, easing the required jamming power needs, and to 
concentrate on the enemy's tracking radar. SSJ also suffers from a penalty in payload 
capacity, electric power, cooling, increased aerodynamic drags (both induced and 
parasitic drag) and degraded maneuverability. 
d) Stand-off Jamming (SO]) 
Stand-off jamming is accomplished using large aircraft with a dedicated 
EA mission. The SOJ aircraft can accommodate many heavy jammers and does not go 
with the strike force into the combat zone. Instead, the SOJ aircraft loiters in a racetrack 
pattern out of the enemy weapon systems' lethal range, injecting noise jamming signals 
into the victim radars' sidelobes for saturating, obscuring, deceiving, and degrading 
enemy radars' detection capabilities. 
The objective for jamming a search radar from the sidelobes is to make a 
large sector of the indicator (the PPI display) unusable by masking targets in azimuths or 
generating false targets to mislead the enemy's air interception operation. 
Usu~lly, the SOJ aircraft is also equipped with adequate electronic support 
(ES) receivers to locate the potential victims and measure their EM parameters. In 
addition, the on-board computer will assess the related targets, allocate the jamming 
resources and manage the jamming (such as power management, time sharing, look-
through jamming) in order to effectively neutralize enemy radars. 
7 
2. Advantage of Stand-off Jamming 
Unlike other EA tactics (stand-forward, self-screening and escort jamming), the 
SOJ platform remains completely out of the enemy's air defense weapon system and anti-
radiation missile (ARM) lethal range. It primarily radiates jamming signals into the 
enemy radars' sidelobes to protect friendly penetrating strike echelon which are at 
different ranges and azimuths than the SOJ aircraft. 
The intended victims of the SOJ are the acquisition radars (air search radars), 
rather than those tracking radars used by terminal point defense systems, since the basic 
function of the SOJ is to open a safe corridor within the enemy's air search radar 
networks by curtailing their detection range allowing an opening for strike penetrations. 
The SOJ needs large amounts of jamming power to achieve the same jamming 
effects as escort jamming due to the much longer operating range (typically, 30-100 nmi 
away from the victim radars) as compared with other jamming operations. 
Maneuverability is not a critical requirement for the SOJ jammer carrier, enabling the use 
of heavier aircraft. 
Typical SOJ aircraft, like the EA-6B Prowler and EF-111 Raven can carry a large 
amount of pod mounted jammer transmitters, which cover several different frequency 
bands so that they can cover almost all hostile radar systems. Such systems use 
frequencies that are widely spread in different EM bands. The multi-target jamming 
capability of the SOJ is an important advantage, which allows operations in a high threat 
density battlefield. 
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SOJ provides high duty-cycle CW noise jamming for masking purposes and smart 
deception low duty-cycle pulsed noise jamming to mislead enemy interception in both 
wrong directions and areas. It is a necessary compliment to self-protection jamming and 
anti-radiation missiles in the suppression of enemy air defense systems. 
3. Noise Injection into Sidelobes 
Antenna sidelobes are one of the most serious weaknesses in the radar system in 
terms of electronic protection (EP). They provide a path for jamming and 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) to enter the radar system aggravating system 
performance significantly. 
Since the antenna represents the transducer between the radar and the 
environment, it is the first line of defense against hostile jamming. The space 
discrimination capability of a radar system is determined by antenna coverage, scan 
control, mainbeam width, and sidelobe controls (low sidelobes). 
As to directivity of the radar antenna, antenna designers do their best to 
concentrate all outgoing radiated energy through the mainbeam surrounding the boresight 
to get the best target discrimination and detection capabilities. In the real world, 
however, these goals cannot be completely met, due to sidelobes located on either side of 
the rnainlobe and even in the backside of the mainlobe (backlobe ). 
The desired radiation pattern focuses all of the transmitted energy into a narrow 
beam (mainlobe only), whereby the power is uniformly distributed just like a flashlight on 
an imaginary screen in the sky which would illuminate a single round spot with uniform 
intensity. An antenna's sidelobes are not limited to the forward hemisphere and, in fact, 
they extend in all directions, even to the rear. 
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For a uniformly illuminated rectangular aperture, such as that used in AEW 
radars, the gain of the strongest (first) sidelobe is about 13.5 dB less than that of the 
rnainlobe (Skolnik, 1990), while the second sidelobe is about 20 dB less than that of the 
rnainlobe. Typically, 25 percent of the total power is radiated by the sidelobes due to 
inefficiencies in the antenna (Edde, 1993). The sidelobes not only waste transmitted 
power in undesired directions but also increase the susceptibility of the radar to jamming. 
Interference from a powerful jammer into the sidelobes can be stronger than the echoes of 
small or distant targets in the rnainlobe, resulting in the loss of desired targets. 
The radar system will present these strong jamming signals corning from the 
sidelobes in the rnainlobe direction on the display (angular deception), which obscures 
targets on the radar screen, thereby preventing track of the intended targets. 
Without adequate EP techniques, the AEW system radar detection capability will 
be significantly affected by sidelobe jamming. Sidelobe handling is a critical concern in 
an AEW system's operational effectiveness (detectivity) and survivability (and anti-
radiation missile (ARM) can horne in on sidelobe radiation toward the AEW platform). 
In addition, sidelobe return (sidelobe clutter) degrades airborne radar system performance 
substantially. 
Owing to the above mentioned reasons, sidelobes represent a major area of 
vulnerability to the AEW system. 
B. AEW SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Function of AEW System 
Sir Winston Churchill said that "three things played decisive roles in winning the 
Battle of Britain: the RAF pilots, the Spitfire Fighter, and Radar." (Stimson, 1983). The 
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importance of the radar system in air defense was obviously expressed. Based on lessons 
learned from the Falkland Islands War, the British Navy modified the Searchwater marine 
radar (installing a larger antenna and revised target processing algorithms) and integrated 
it into the S-3 Sea King Helicopter to fill the Airborne Early Warning and Control gap. In 
the Bekaa Valley, the Israeli Air Force fully utilized an AEW system (E2-C) and EA 
operation, creating a brilliant air-to-air kill ratio (87:0). From the above it can be seen 
that the importance of the AEW system is fully confirmed and battle proven. 
AEW systems have been used as a command, control, communication, and 
intelligence (C3D force multiplier in air-to-air and air-to-surface (ground and sea) 
operations. The role of the AEW system in a typical modem war is addressed in the 
following paragraphs. 
a) Air Defense Functions 
As an air defense tool, the AEW system detects, identifies, classifies, and 
tracks all friendly and hostile air targets. As noted previously, the ability of radar systems 
to fulfill the air defense role is enhanced when mounted in airborne platforms, as opposed 
to the ground. 
b) Command Functions 
AEW systems also serve as a logical command center in the direction of 
CAP, offensive counter air (OCA), and defensive counter air (DCA) operations, as well 
as management of support task force elements (refueling tanker, EA aircraft, ES aircraft 
and combat search and rescue (SAR) efforts. A more direct combat role is played by the 
AEW system when it is the source of clearance for firing beyond visual range (BVR) 
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missiles in long to medium range air-to-air engagements and serving as a forward 
deployed air command post. 
c) ConuolFunctions 
The modern AEW system provides control functions to air operations in a 
variety of ways. Strike aircraft receive clearance to enter and exit battle zones, and 
penetration and maritime strike missions are monitored from, AEW systems in the 
relevant operational theater. AEW systems play a more direct combat role in guiding 
battlefield air interdiction (BAI), close air support (CAS), and suppression of enemy air 
defense (SEAD) missions. Additionally, strategic and tactical airlift and reconnaissance 
flights are accomplished using AEW systems on station to provide checkpoint 
information. Friendly aircraft are alerted to threats by the AEW system, which is also 
used to coordinate aerial refueling and for air traffic control. 
d) Communication Functions 
In air operations taking place over a wide geographic area, the AEW 
system serves as a communications relay between distant air task forces and their 
commands and support elements. When friendly forces from different commands 
rendezvous for joint operations, AEW systems in the area provide communications and 
fOOrdination as elements enter the area of operations. 
e) Intelligence Functions 
The presence of an AEW system makes it possible to survey all air, sea, 
and ground vehicle traffic in a given area. This allows the provision of real-time 
information to theater commanders and decision-makers. Early warning of enemy 
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activity provides key intelligence to battlefield commanders. The AEW system also 
fulfills an electronic support (ES/ESM) function. 
2. AEW System Electronic Protection (EP) Implementation 
The AEW system is designed to perform its surveillance mission in a 
highly hostile environment against possible adversaries that will utilize EA to enhance 
their penetration capability. The major EA threats against an AEW system are ( 1) noise 
jamming, (2) deception jamming, (3) chaff, (4) decoys and expendables, and (5) anti-
radiation missiles (ARM). The possible EA counter-measures against the AEW system 
initiated by the adversary are focused on the following aspects of AEW Gf>erations 
(Farina, 1992): 
• Denial of detection 
• Operator confusion or deception 
• Delay in detection or tracking initiation 
• Tracking of an invalid target 
• Overloading the computer (excessive number of false targets) 
• Denial of measurement of target position and range rate 
• Target tracking loss 
• Errors in values of target position and range rate 
• Target tracking loss 
• Errors in values of target position and range rate 
On the other hand, the AEW system will also utilize all available on-board EP 
equipment to secure their detection and tracking mission even under a severe EA 
situation against both single or a combination of denial and deceptive EA techniques. 
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The AEW system EP actions are as follows (Chrzanowski, 1990): 
• Prevention of receiver saturation 
• Constant false alarm rate (CFAR) 
• Enhancement of S/J ratio 
• Directional interference discrimination 
• Rejection of false targets 
• Maintenance of track 
EP techniques utilized in AEW systems are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
a) Transmitter Electronic Protection (EP) Techniques 
(1) Frequency Agility (FA). Frequency agility complicates 
radar signal interception and identification by hostile ES/ESM systems and dilutes hostile 
jamming effectiveness. If the AEW system uses frequency agility transmitting, it will 
cause the enemy jammer to spread its jamming power over a much wider bandwidth 
(switching from spot jamming to barrage jamming), thus lowering jamming power 
density and effectiveness at any given time and frequency. 
Frequency agility can be implemented on the basis of pulse-to-
pulse, scan-to-scan, or burst-to-burst, depending on the system's capabilities and 
limitations. However, as a result of long coherent integration periods needed to facilitate 
the airborne moving target indicator (AMTD and coherent integration functions used in 
the E-2C system, it does not use the frequency agility technique. From the EP standpoint, 
pulse-to-pulse frequency agility is the most effective way to counter jamming. The 
needed coherent integration time and the requirement for suppression of surface clutter 
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make fully random pulse-to-pulse frequency agility impractical for use in AEW systems 
(Neri, 1991). 
A possible compromise can be made by setting a predetermined 
fixed frequencies bank over a certain frequency range in which the transmitting frequency 
is chosen randomly; and then using a special memory to store each return in the 
appropriate Doppler bin for subsequent Doppler processing. This technique, however, is 
generally too complicated for application to practical systems. 
(2) PRF Agility. The AEW radar's PRF should be able to 
change (PRF jittering/switching/staggering) in response to the EA situation ana targets' 
maneuvering status. Switching the PRF not only deals with the target's Doppler 
frequency in different aspects (blind speeds) and velocities (high and low, opening and 
closing), but also enhances the effectiveness of radar frequency agility against EA. 
\ The combination of exerting both PRF and frequency agility 
enhances the AEW systems survivability in a severe hostile jamming environment. The 
use of PRF agility, however, is still governed by some limitations (if the system is subject 
to long coherent processing intervals it will not be able to effectively apply PRF agility) 
(Winnefeld, 1994 ). 
(3) Waveform. The AEW radar waveform can provide a very 
powerful EP capability. For example, spread spectrum ( a wide bandwidth random 
waveform) can greatly complicate hostile electronic support (ES) system operation and 
also reduce the effectiveness of hostile jamming by forcing the jammer to spread its 
power over a wider bandwidth (Thomas, 1987). 
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Spread spectrum countermeasures make the AEW system more 
complicated, but the results are fruitful - especially in preventing an ARM from hitting 
the AEW platform and also by degrading the enemy's jamming capability. 
( 4) Pulse Compression. Pulse compression is a technique 
whereby long coded pulses (expanded pulse) are transmitted, allowing a higher average 
power output that improves signal-to-noise ratio while processing the received echo into a 
narrow pulse (compressed wave). This provides high range resolution consistent with the 
bandwidth of the transmitted pulse. 
Pulse compression was applied by Germany in World War II as an 
electronic counter-measure against chaff. Owing to its good range resolution, the pulse 
compression technique permits discrimination of target echoes from chaff in some 
situations (chaff has long been used to provide corridor masking real targets and in 
generating false targets). In addition, pulse compression can ~low targets in close 
formation to be discriminated from each other. 
Significant advances in digital and surface-acoustic-wave delay 
(SAW) structure techniques allow the implementation of more exo~ic signal waveforms 
such as nonlinear FM. However, the most commonly used pulse compression waveforms 
are still linear-FM and phase-coded signals. AEW systems use pulse compression to 
improve the detection capability in noise jamming (higher S/J ratio), discriminate targets 
within close formation, and counter chaff operation. Pulse compression is fully 
compatible with Doppler processing techniques used to discriminate against clutter. 
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b) Antenna EP. 
( 1) Beam width. In a chaff environment, the AEW radar 
antenna beamwidth should be as small as possible in both azimuth and elevation to 
reduce the chaff illumination volume. Monopulse reception techniques provide some 
additional EP capabilities through the resulting beam sharpening. 
If a jammer injects jamming power into the radar's mainlobe, any 
attack echelon within the main antenna's lobe will probably be masked. However, if the 
jammer is located on the target to be shielded, then it becomes susceptible to home-on-
jam counter jamming techniques. This inhibits the use of noise jamming in deceptive 
self-protection jammers and increases the vulnerability of Escort and stand-forward 
jamming tactics. In SOJ, the main beam response is generally blended, creating a 
corridor of protection. This favors high frequency radar operation with associated narrow 
mainbeam radar beamwidths. 
(2) Polarization Agility. Polarization agility may reduce the 
effectiveness of certain EA techniques. Many jammers employ circular polarization for 
handling different types of polarization (horizontal or vertical) used by the victim radars. 
If possible, variable polarization should be provided in the AEW 
radar for altering its polarization, which might reduce the received jamming signal. If the 
radar transmits circular polarization and the receiver can receive several polarizations, 
one particular polarization may be found to provide an improvement in J/S ratio. In 
general, both target and clutter polarization characteristics may affect the results. Owing 
to the system and operational limitations, most AEW systems probably lack the flexibility 
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of polarization agility. If the radar's received polarization can be adjusted to be 
orthogonal to the jammers polarization, substantial jamming energy is rejected. 
(3) Low/Ultra-low Sidelobe Antenna (ULSA). Low sidelobe 
antennas and ultra-low sidelobe antennas are achieved through controlled antenna 
illumination functions, avoiding aperture blockage as well as careful manufacturing and 
handling. 
The choice of the antenna illumination function is critical. With 
reflector antennas, the designer can only control the illumination function in the design of 
the feed. With arrays, newer modeling techniques allow good control of aperture 
illumination, so most low sidelobe antennas are arrays, but their bandwidths are limited. 
Recent work on reflector antennas has provided wide bandwidth, low sidelobe antennas. 
Aperture blockage is another major concern in antenna sidelobe 
suppression techniques, and should be taken into account in antenna design. Near-field 
blockages external to the antenna, such as masts, poles, and guard railings have the same 
effect on sidelobes as blockages attached to the antenna (such as feeds and struts). As far 
as aperture blockage is concerned, array antennas are better than those using reflector type 
antennas. Surface smoothness in the case of reflectors, and phase control in arrays, 
significantly affect sidelobe levels. In phase-steered antennas, phase control granularity 
plays a major role in determining sidelobes. For this reason, newer phase-steered arrays 
tend toward finer control of phase-shifters (i.e., higher number of bits in distant phase 
control). 
An ULSA antenna can eliminate some impacts caused by 
sidelobes. However, this sidelobe suppression method results in some penalties, such as 
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a lowered gain and wider beam (reducing some range resolution and EP capabilities). 
Roughly speaking, the standard antenna's peak sidelobe could be -13 to -30 dB less than 
the mainlobe gain; in a low sidelobe antenna, the peak sidelobe is about -30 to -40 dB less 
(Schleher, 1986), while an ultra-low sidelobe antenna's first sidelobe would be -40 to -70 
dB less. In addition, a traditional method to reduce sidelobes is to increase the size of the 
antenna aperture. However, the AEW system is subject to space limitations. The 
decision to employ such methods should consider the expected mission capabilities, 
available technology, and limitations of the platform. 
(4) Sidelobe Blanker (SLB). The sidelobe blanker was 
originally used by radar for screening out electromagnetic interference (EMD from nearby 
friendly radar, which entered through antenna sidelobes. Designers utilize the SLB to 
cope with low duty-cycle deceptive jammers (like the false target generator, or spoofer). 
Basically, the SLB can blank pulsed noise signal, but is ineffective against high-duty 
cycle continuous wave (CW) noise jamming. 
The SLB system is useful in preventing acquisition of strong 
targets in the antenna sidelobes, and also for rejecting pulsed interference (jamming 
signal) in the sidelobes. 
From the EP point of view, returns detected in the mainlobe are the 
only desired signal, which is then further processed and displayed on the radar scope. 
Besides, any signal received from the sidelobes should be rejected in order to avoid being 
deceived by the intended hostile jamming signals or interfered with by strong sidelobe 
clutter. 
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To achieve this screening function, the SLB system is composed of a 
guard (auxiliary) antenna, a sidelobe blanking receiver and a comparator. The gain of the 
guard antenna is less than that of the mainlobe of the radar primary antenna but bigger 
than the radar antenna's sidelobes. By suitable comparison of signals in the main and 
guard channels, the system can distinguish whether signals come from the mainlobe or 
the sidelobes. The output of two independent receivers (main and sidelobe blanking) are 
sent to the comparator to decide whether to initiate the blanking logic unit. The 
comparison is made at each range bin for each pulse received and processed by the two 
parallel channels. 
If the detected targets are within the mainlobe, a large signal in the 
main receiving channel and a small signal in the auxiliary receiving channel results. The 
blanking logic unit will allow this signal to pass for further signal processing. On the 
other hand, if the jammers are situated in the sidelobes, the guard antenna signal will be 
bigger than the mainlobe signal, and the logic unit will block this signal from passing to 
the next level of the signal analysis circuit. 
(5) Sidelobe Canceller (SLC). The SLC is utilized to suppress 
high duty cycle jamming signals received through the antenna's sidelobes. At least one 
SLC cancellation loop and an omni-directional auxiliary antenna (it could also be shared 
with SLB) are required to deal with each jammer by creating an antenna null at the 
azimuth position where the jammer is located. The objective of the SLC is to eliminate 
high duty cycle noise jamming signals received through the sidelobes of the radar. 
In many cases, the SLC system is used in conjunction with a SLB 
or a low sidelobe antenna to suppress the jamming signal from the radar scope. The 
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SLC' s basic operational function is to equip the radar with an array of auxiliary antennas 
used to adaptively estimate the direction of arrival (DOA) and the jamming power of each 
jammer. The resulting step is to adjust the receiving pattern of the radar antenna, putting 
nulls in the jammer's direction to prevent the jamming signal from entering the signal 
processing unit. Some of the current SLC systems are built with digital technology, but 
the use of existing analog adaptive coherent sidelobe canceller (CSLC) is more practical. 
The auxiliary antenna gains are designed to approximate the 
average sidelobe level of the main antenna gain pattern. The target signal received by the 
auxiliary antenna is weak compared to the signals received by the main channel. The 
target signal time duration is also much smaller than the SLC' s adaptation time. Thus, 
the target signals will pass through the SLC, while the jamming signal, which is 
continuous in time, will be reduced through the adaptive process generated in the 
canceller. 
The SLC can be implemented with a reflector type of antenna 
where the auxiliary antennas are dipoles on the periphery of the reflector. The auxiliary 
antennas can also be integrated into a phased-array antenna (using sub-arrays), but the 
electromagnetic coupling between antennas should be minimized to maintain low 
quiescent sidelobe level. 
C. RECEIVER AND SIGNAL PROCESSING EP 
The AEW system can be deployed in hostile areas (potential flash points), so the 
receiver and signal processing unit should be able to work well under the strong signal 
EA situation and in a strong clutter environment. Receivers must be designed to function 
in a very high signal level environment, on the order of 20 to 40 dB J/S (Morchin, 1990), 
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to avoid being saturated or to prevent the formation of intermodulation products. The 
receiving system must recognize, identify and counter the incident interference (jamming) 
as well as to discriminate targets masked by terrain or ground/sea clutter. 
Pre-detection filters should be installed ahead of the RF amplifier and mixer to 
screen out-of-band signals, thereby alleviating the signal processing load and easing 
desensitization problems. For accommodating transmitter's frequency agility, the 
receiver should be able to work in a wide bandwidth to follow each possible frequency 
change by the transmitter. An image rejection filter with a high dynamic range IF mixer 
is very important to prevent spurious signals from being generated in the receiver. 
Adding the capability of examining the jammer signals to find gaps in their transmitted 
spectrum and select the frequency with the least level of jamming enables the AEW 
system to gain a favorable situation against EA. 
To prevent the receiver from being saturated by CW noise jamming, the receiver's 
dynamic range should be appropriately wide (linear receivers are suggested). In addition, 
to process clutter and chaff effectively, digital coherent signal processing (fixed or 
adaptive MTI) must be integrated into the system. 
In adaptive MTI, a notch in the receiver response is adaptively placed at the center 
of the AE\V ground/sea clutter or chaff Doppler frequency spectrum to separate the real 
targets from the clutter and chaff cloud. 
A scenario using both chaff corridors and active jamming (false target and CW 
noise jamming) to obscure the attack force is highly possible in a modern deep strike air 
operation. 
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A dilemma is presented when the AEW system needs to handle both active and 
passive (chaff) jamming simultaneously. Pulse-to-pulse frequency agility is effective 
against active (deception and camouflage) jamming. However, Doppler-based MTI 
techniques, which are the key to eliminate chaff masking effects, need constant frequency 
and stable PRF. 
Constant false alarm rate (CFAR) is required to avoid the receiver's video and 
system computer from being overloaded by noise pulses. Different types of CF AR are 
available, such as log, cell averaging, distribution-free, and Dicke fix CFAR. 
Countermeasures and counter-countermeasures continually respond to each other. 
The AEW system's receiver and signal processing unit require continuous evaluation, 
with focus on new EA techniques for adding threshold circuits and logic elements to fend 
off jamming signals and ensure the detection function. 
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Ill. EVALUATION OF SOJ EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST THE 
AEWSYSTEM 
A. SCENARIO AND PARAMETER SELECTION 
1. Scenario Selection 
For the purpose of enhancing jamming effectiveness, penetrators will generally be 
covered using several SOJ jammers that inject large amounts of noise jamming signals 
into the AEW system's sidelobes and mainlobes from different azimuths (the 
implementation scheme is shown in Figure 1). The AEW system is equipped with eight 
sidelobe cancellers (ideally, one cancellation loop can deal with each jammer). Due to 
the moving platform factor, wideband jamming, and multi-path effects, the required 
number of sidelobe cancellers (sidelobe cancellation loop) is about three times larger than 
the number of jammers to be suppressed (Schleher, 1986). If the number of jammers is 
less than four, the AEW system radar can theoretically put spatial nulls in the jammers' 
direction, thereby filtering out the jamming signal to minimize the effectiveness of the 
SOJ. If the jammers number more than three, the AEW system detection capabilities are 
degraded by the increased J/S ratio. The sidelobe cancellation system is not effective 
against jamming signals which enter the radar through its main antenna beam. 
As to how much degradation can be achieved by the SOJ, one must examine how 
many jammers have been deployed by the SOJ operation, their ERP, how many sidelobe 
cancellers are being deployed, and the sidelobes' gain of the AEW system. 
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Simulation will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of SOJ against a hypothetical 
AEW system in the following scenarios: 
• Situations using no SOJ jamming; to determine the AEW system's full 
detection range 
• Situations using one to three SOJ jammers 
• Situations using more than three SOJ jammers 
• Situations using combined EA techniques 
• Situations using self-screening jamming alone (only one SSJ jammer) 
• Situations using SOJ to open a screening corridor 
The simulation model calculates the AEW system's detection range in response to 
pre-planned scenarios. Since this thesis relies on unclassified information, all parameters 
used in this simulation are hypothetical values that provide a rough estimation of SOJ 
impacts on the AEW system's detection capabilities. 
As noted previously, the purpose of this thesis is not to generate precise results in 
simulating the response of a particular AEW system against SOJ noise jamming, but 
rather to identify the vulnerabilities of the AEW system that could be exploited by a well-
planned and fully-equipped adversary. 
Highly accurate prediction values are not available from this conceptual model 
(due to the hypothetical nature of system parameters). The model will still provide a 
groundwerk for realistic evaluations of real systems when real EA and EP tactics and 
techniques are fed into this model. 
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2. Parameter Selection 
Parameters for simulation modeling are based on hypothetical values obtained 
from open sources and related unclassified data from manufacturers. These parameters 
are not intended to represent any fielded system, as the primary goal of the simulation is 
to present a picture of current technology and model the response of an AEW system 
subjected to SOJ. The chosen parameters for the AEW system are presented in Table 1, 
while Tables 2 and 3 present the parameters for the SOJ system and the boundary 
conditions for the simulation model, respectively. Figure 1 illustrates the relative 
positions of the AEW system, SOJ elements, and attack echelons. 
a e . L'po e 1ca ;ys em T bl 1 H th f I AEW S t P arame er a ues. t V I 
Nomenclature Parameter Value Remark 
Transmitter Power (P1) Peak power: 2.5 MW Average Power: 18.75 KW 
Antenna Gain (GRJt) 22.5 dB 177.8 Power Ratio 
Antenna Scan Rate 6rpm Scan Rate=36°/sec 
Pulse Repetition Frequency 300HZ PRF 
Carrier Frequency (fc) 425 MHZ± 25 MHZ UHF Band 
Noise Figure (Fn) 3dB 
System Loss (LR) 6.0dB 
Receiver Bandwidth 7.5MHZ Br 
3 dB Beamwidth (HPBW) 6.5° 
Sidelobe Gain (GsL. Ist) -5.5 dBi First Sidelobe Gain 
Averaged Sidelobe Gain -15.5 dBi GsL, in free space 
Frequency Agility (FA) No frequency agility 
Receiving System Noise 440°K Includes Galactic N oise-150° 
Temperature (T s) Kelvin 
Sidelobe Suppression 8 channel SLC and SLB SLC: Sidelobe Canceller 
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Table 2. SOJ Parameter Values. 
Nomenclature Parameter Value Remark 
Transmitter Power (P1) 1,500 Watts for SOJ 
200 Watts for SSJ 
Jammer Antenna Gain (GJ) 3dB 
Jammer System Loss (L1) 7 dB Including polarization loss, 
etc. 
Jammer Bandwidth (B1) Spot: 5-20 MHZ 
Barrage: 50 MHZ 
T bl 3 B d a e oun ary c d"f on I IODS. 
Nomenclature Parameter Value Remark 
Target's Length 17.32 m MiG-29 Fighter 
Probability of Dectection (Po) 90% 
False Alarm Rate (Pra) w-b approximately one false alarm 
occurs each hour of operation 
AEW Flying Altitude 25,000 ft 
Target's RCS 10m' Typical Fighter-bomber 
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B. SIMULATION MODEL AND DATA GENERATION 
The simulation code (RGJMAT) used was written by Professor D. Curtis Schieber 
of the Naval Postgraduate School using Quick Basic Code, based upon formulas in his 
book Introduction to Electronic Warfare. The code used Barton's and Alberhseim's 
methods for calculating visibility factors, SIN ratio, Swerling cases, and atmospheric and 
weather attenuation. Blake's method is applied to calculate the radar range equation, 
which then uses Newton's method to determine the range in atmospheric and weather 
attenuation. Jamming effects for a self-screening noise jammer and up to 10 stand-off 
jammers are included by combining the jammer power density with the system noise 
power density. The program allows radar detection range to be calculated for 
conventional, pulse compression, frequency agility, and pulsed Doppler radars. 
Lt. Tim Rohrer, USN, converted Professor Schieber's Quick Basic Code to 
MA TLAB Code and also completed a user's manual. A further reconfiguration and 
modification in input, output interfaces, display, and additional plotting function were 
made in the course of this work. 
The simulation can handle steady and Swerling targets, atmospheric and weather 
attenuation, and SSJ and SOJ jamming techniques for conventional, frequency agility, 
and pulsed Doppler mdar (PD). 
The structure of the model is shown in Figure 2, and a flow chart of operations is 
presented in ~igure 3. The building blocks of the model can be divided into eight parts, 
which include parameter input, subroutines, the main computation program, and the 




Parameters Input & Screen Display Setting J 
Fixed/Changeable Parameters and 1/P Window 
I Fetch Data from the Screen and Perfonn I Calculation for Obtaining Index Range, R, I 
j Detectability Factor Computation (D~.)) 
~,. 
I Swerling Type Model Processing ,. 
,if 
Atmospheric and Weather Attenuation Calculation 
,if 
I Jamming Techniques Selection I 
(SOJ or SSJ alone I SSJ plus SOJ) I , 
Jammer Parameters 
Main Computation Program 
1. Calculate the range with no jamming. 
2. Compute SSJ alone - R_., R,.. Rj 
-(one jammer only) 
3. Calculate SOJ alone - R.o 
4. Multi-Jammer and Mixed Jamming Techniques (SSJ+SOJ) 
*Obtaining: R_., R...,, R,.. 
*Getting R,. degraded detection range in a 
hostile jamming environment 
"" 
Plotting Subroutine ..., 
Plot the detection range vs. Swerling Status, 
Antenna pattern (2-D plot) 
j 1. Display detection range vs. Swerling Case. I 
2. Resetting parameters and jamming techniques j 
1 for next simulation. 
Figure 2. Simulation Structure Block Diagram. 
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RGJMAT Start 
Parameters Setting & Screen Display Setting 
Fetch Data from the Screen and Perform 
Calculation for Obtaining Index Range, R. 
Swerting Type Model Processing 
Atmospheric and Weather Attenuation Calculation 
Main Computation Program 
Generating: R_, R,.. R,.R... R_ 
Plotting Program 
Plot the degraded detection range 2-D diagram 
Stop 
Figure 3. Simulation Flow Chart. 
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Parameter input requirements include both fixed and variable parameters. Fixed 
values are used for propagation constants, ambient temperature, rain and atmospheric 
attenuation tables, and system constants. Variable parameters for the AEW system 
include center frequency, pulse repetition frequency, pulse width, transmitter power, 
transmitter antenna gain, receiver antenna gain, antenna sidelobe gain, radar system loss, 
Doppler bandwidth, frequency agility bandwidth, antenna scan rate, half-power 
beam width, probability of detection, probability of false alann, and noise figure. Variable 
parameters for the SOJ and SSJ systems include jammer power, antenna gain, system 
loss, elevation angle, height, selected technique, bandwidth (spot or barrage), the number 
of jammers, the target's radar cross-section (RCS) and length, and the rainfall rate. 
The second part of the program is responsible for fetching parameters keyed in on 
the screen and for calculating the index range (free space clear detection range when 
SIN= 1, Ro) for the follow-on manipulations. 
The third part of the program calculates the detectability factor (SIN ratio), which 
is used to calculate the detection range based on the selected probabilities of detection 
and false alarms. The fourth part of the program is the Swerling model, which covers all 
type of target RCS fluctuations, including the effects of frequency agility. 
The fifth part of the program is the atmospheric and weather attenuation 
subroutine, which calculates the attenuation caused by atmospheric and weather 
absorption. Attenuation is heavily dominated by the frequency chosen by the AEW 
system. 
Jamming mode selection (SSJ/SOJ alone or SSJ+SOJ) is the sixth part of the 
.. 
program, and includes parameter selection for the various jamming options. Th~ seventh 
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element is the main part of the simulation model - the main computation program, which 
obtains the index range Ro, self-screening range Rsso (S/J=l), Rjo (under SSJ and S/J=l), 
jammed detection range Rj (the degraded detection range caused by jamming in different 
Swerling cases), stand-off jamming detection range Rso and degraded detection range due 
to the combined SSJ and SOJ jamming. 
The last component is the plotting program. This includes 2-D schemes, which 
show the normalized theoretical AEW antenna pattern and degraded detection range in 
different Swerling cases. The results of this simulation model are shown on the screen as 
both a figure (2-D plot) and numerical data set (atmospheric attenuation;-weather 
attenuation, and degraded detection range forms). In addition a new run could be started 
by resetting the parameters through the keyboard. 
1. Simulation Model Description and Parameters 
a) Determining the Index Range 
The index range is the range at which SIN= 1. At this range, there is no 
hostile jamming, or atmospheric or weather attenuation. The free space index range Ro is 
given by 
Table 4 presents the baseline parameters used for the sensitivity analysis of the model. 
Substituting the parameters given in the table in the above equation results in a range of 
363.5lnmi. 
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The index range Ro (SIN=l) is utilized for calculating Rjo and the jammer 
degraded detection range Rj and their relations where 
and 
-D;(n)/ 
R. = R .0 ·10 l.ro J J 
b) Determining Key Drivers and Special Considerations 
For the purpose of finding crucial factors in dominating the degradation, 
the simulation model was repeatedly run, and only one or two parameters were changed 
for each run in order to determine the interaction among the variables. The baseline is 
based upon the parameter values listed in Table 4, and the evaluating procedures are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
( 1) Baseline Comparison. A fixed baseline value set allows the ,. 
examination of individual parameters' role in evaluating the AEW system detection 
performance. In order to get a better picture of this process, different increments and 
decrements were used for specified purposes (such as a GsL value of -30 dB for an ultra-
low sidelobe antenna, but 30% deviation is the typical case). In terms of deciding the 
baseline value and their deviations, both technical limitations and operational 
considerations have been taken into account in order to get this simulation as close as 
possible to real world situations. 
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T bl S . . . A I . a e 4. Baseline Parameters for ensitavity DalySIS. 
Pt 2,500KW 
fc 425±25 :MHZ 
Pulse Width 25 uSee 
RCS lOm:t 
GT 22.5 dB 
GR 22.5 dB 
GsL -15.5 dB 
Fn 3dB 
LR 6dB 




BWoopp 18.75 HZ 
BWFA 0 (without frequency agility) 
Antenna Rotation Speed 36°/sec 
Elevation Angle oo 
Target Length 17.32 m (MiG-29) 
SSJ (Boolean) 0 







BWsOJ 7.5 MHZ (spotjammiQ.g) 
50 MHZ (barrage jamming) 
L1(SOJ) 7dB 
H1 (Height) 25,000 ft 
R1 (Jamming Range) 30nmi 




(2) Sensitivity Analysis. Table 5 contains results of modeling 
using different parameter values. The purpose of this comparison is to determine how 
sensitive the model results are to changes in specific parameter values. Changes in value 
for radar effective radiated power (P,.GT, ERP), jammer ERP (P1G1), jammer bandwidth 
(spot or barrage jamming), jammer stand-off range (RJ), and radar transmitter-to-sidelobe 
gain ratio yield a greater impact on detection range than changes in other input 
parameters. The decision to use higher frequencies, which result in narrower beamwidth 
and lower sidelobes, and lower frequencies, which yield wider beamwidth and higher 
sidelobe levels, is a function of mission requirements. 
(3) Key Drivers. Comparison of the values in Table 5 allows 
the determination of key variables in the model, that is, parameters for which changes in 
value represent significant changes in AEW systems detection range. The results of this 
tabular sensitivity analysis are in agreement with the equation for jamming range 
(4) Special Considerations. The hypothetical AEW system is 
equipped with 8 sidelobes cancellers (SLC) which can typically deal with 3 jammers 
while providing a GsL of -15.5 dBi, thereby reducing jamming signals. The -15.5 dBi 
value for GsL is derived as follows. It is assumed that the average sidelobe level (see 
Table 1) is degraded through installation in the aircraft by 10dB (ap Rhys, 1974). Further, 
a typical ground-based radar SLC processing gain of 20-30 dB (Schieber, 1986) is 
estimated to only provide 10 dB in this airborne installation due to multi-path factors, 
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platform motion, and polarization effects. If there are more than three jammers, the 
resulting GsL will be -5.5 dB, as no additional cancellers are present and no more SLC 
processing advantage is available to suppress the jamming signals. According to the 
simulation model, as soon as the number 4 jammer is actuated, the detection range will 
drop from 62.21 mni (three jarmner case) to 32.56 nmi (four jammer case), thereby 
reducing the AEW system detection performance significantly. 
T bl 5 S a e . ensitlvity A I . nalySIS. 
PT (KW) GT & GR (dB) GsL (dB) 
Value 
-30% Baseline +30% -100% Baseline +100% Test Value Baseline Test Value 
1,750 2,500 3,250 19.5 22.5 25.5 -5.5 +-5.5 -30 
RJ 56.91 62.21 66.43 44.04 62.21 87.88 34.99 62.21 139.89 
PJ G1 (dB) B1 (MHZ) 
Value 
-30% Baseline +30% -100% Baseline +100% Spot Jam Baseline Barrage Jam 
1,050 .1,500 1,950 0 3 6 7.5 20 50 
RJ 68.02 62.21 58.26 73.94 62.21 52.35 40.96 62.21 78.61 
HP PW (De .) R1 (nmi) RCS (mL) 
Value 
-30% Baseline +30% -50% Baseline +67% -30% Baseline +30% 
4.55 6.5 8.45 20 30 50 7 10 13 
RJ 57.95 62.21 65.43 50.61 62.21 80.84 56.91 62.21 66.43 
#of Jammers H1 (ft) Antenna Scan Rate (deg./sec.) 
Value -66.7% Baseline +30% -30% Baseline +30% -30% Baseline +30% 
1 3 4 17,500 25,000 32,500 25 36 47 
RJ 81.79 62.21 32.56 62.5 62.21 62.06 66.69 62.21 59.01 
2. Simulation Results 
a) Detection Ranges 
The computer program, using the parameters for the hypothetical AEW 
system given in Table 1 provides a detection range of 242.17 nmi on a 10 m
2 Swerling 1 
target. The Swerling 1 target is used since it represents the target fluctuations 
exhibited by a typical tactical fighter-bomber. 
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b) Situations using One to Three SOl Jammers 
In the presence of only one SOJ, the detection range is reduced from 
242.17 nmi to 81.79 nmi. The SOJ influence in reducing the AEW system's detection 
performance is quite clear. The detection range performance for one to three SOJs is 
given in Figure 4 for cases 0-4. 
















___ Ci 1 SOJ 
<D 2 SOJs : 
CD 3 SOJs_: _ 
i oL-----~-------L------~----~-------L------J-------~----~ 
0 1 2 3 4 
Swerling Case (Jammers Height= 25000 ft, Jam Angle= 0 deg) 
Figure 4. Detection Performance of AEW System in the Presence of One to Three 
Stand-off Jammers. 
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c) Situations using Four SO] Jammers 
The detection performance of the hypothetical AEW system with one to 
four SOls is depicted in Figure 5. The fourth jammer is assumed to have no SLC 
processing, since all eight SLCs are occupied with processing the first three jammers. 
The detection range for this case is reduced to 32.56 nautical miles. 
Jamming Environment (4 SOJ Jammers) 
140r------,-------.-------.------.-------r------.-------r------~ 
120 ... J' 
(~ 
<D 
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<D 4 SOJs • 
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Swerling Case (Jammers Height= 25000 ft, Jam Angle = 0 deg) 




d) Self-Screening Jamming (One SSJ Jammer Only) 
SSJ is applied through the victim radar's main beam at close-in range; 
therefore less ERP is required, as compared with SOJ jamming. A single SSJ jammer can 
degrade the AEW system's detection range to about 13.84 nmi. However, SSJ at these 
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Swerling Case (Jammers Height= 25000 fl, Jam Angle= 0 ~eg) 
' 
Figure 6. Detection Performance of AEW System in the Presence of Self-Screening 
Jamming (One SSJ Jammer Only). 
e) Combined EA (Three SOJ and One SSJ) 
As a result of joint EA, the AEW' s detection range is further compressed, 
to 13.84 nmi, when a SSJ is used in conjunction with three SOJs. SSJ at these ranges, 
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however, is not generally operationally practical, since the SSJ is subject to home-on-jam 
missile attack. 
T bl 6 D a e . etection R ange D df UdV' J egra a Jon n er ar10us ammmg c d'f OD I IODS. 
Detection Range (R1) Remark 
One SOJ alone 81.79 GsL=-15.5 dBi 
Three SOJs 62.21 GsL=-15.5 dBi 
Four SOJs 32.56 GsL=-5.5 dBi for #4 SOJ 
One SSJ plus three SOJs 13.84 SSJ jamming from mainlobe 
SOJ jamming from sidelobe 
SSJ dominates the combined 
EA operation due to mainlobe 
jamming 
One SSJ alone 13.84 
• All values are for 10m
2
, Swerling 1 targets 
• P1 for SOJ' s are 1 ,500 watts and 200 watts for SSJ 
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Jamming Environment (3 SOJ Jammers and 1 SSJ Jammer) 
140.------.------.------.------.-----.------.------.-----~ 
20' .... , 
c 1 SSJ + 3 SOJs (" 
0~----~----~------~-----L----~------~----~----~ 
0 2 3 4 
Swerling Case (Jammers Height= 25000 fl, Jam Angle= 0 d.eg) 
Figure 7. Detection Performance of AEW System in the Presence of Three SOJs 
and OneSSJ. 
f) Opening a Screening Corridor 
One of the primary missions of SOJ operation is to create a corridor 
through the enemy's radar networks in order to conceal attack echelons from detection 
and in facilitating deep. strike mission implementation. Figure 8 shows the hypothetical 
AEW system antenna pattern in free space. 
By assuming a Gaussian shaped antenna beam pattern, as shown in Figure 
9, it can be determined that the mainbeam beamwidth at the 28 dB point is about 20 
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degrees. This is the angular width through which mainbeam jamming severely degrades 
the AEW system's detection performance. This occurs whenever the main radar antenna 
beam points at the SOJ. A common jamming tactic is to cascade several SOJs to 
collectively create a jamming corridor. 















-200 -150 -100 -50 0 
Azimuth (deg) 
50 100 
Figure 8. AEW System Antenna Pattern in Free Space. 
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Main Beam Power Pattern (HPBW=6.5 deg) 
-5 
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-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 
Azimuth (deg) 
Figure 9. Main Bealn Power Pattern. 
If three SOJ jammers are deployed at 350°, 0°, and 10°, as shown in Figure 10, they will 
blank the AEW sytem over a sector about 40° wide in azimuth (for the purpose of 
ensuring a corridor, the jamming areas are overlapped so that three jamming elements 
create a 40 degree opening). The effective ranges for this condition are depicted in the 
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figure. Note that when the SOJs are not pointing at the radar's beam, then the SOJ 
performance depicted in Figure 4 applies. 









Figure 10. SOJ Corridor Creation Against the AEW System. 
In Figure 10, the first scenario consists of three SOJ jammers opposed to 
the AEW system, where one of the jammers is located within the mainlobe, resulting in 
jamming of the mainlobe (SSJ) with 1,500 watts of power. This curtails the AEW system 
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detection range, reducing it to 3.58 nmi. The SLC is not effective for mainlobe jamming. 
The outer ring represents the effect of three SOJ jammers directed into the AEW system's 
sidelobes. The degraded detection range is about 62.21 nmi in this region, as compared 
with the mainlobe jamming of 3.58 nmi. 
A second scenario (the inner ring in the figure) is comprised of four SOJ 
jammers, where one jammer is within the AEW radar's mainlobe and the azimuthal 
opening width is about 60° (from 340° to 40°). In this case, the detection range of a four-
jammer SOJ from sidelobes is 32.56 nmi. If one jammer falls into the AEW radar's 
mainlobe the response in detection range is 3.58 nmi. One factor that is very important is 
that the SLC is not effective when the SOJ jammer is in the AEW system's mainlobe 
response. 
The primary goal of the SOJ is to open a penetration corridor in which the 
strike force can remain obscured. Reinforcement of EP must be undertaken by the AEW 
system to cope with this possible EA from potential threats. 
As far as EP and carrier frequency are concerned, the E-3A (AWACS) and 
E-2C adopt different approaches. The E-3A utilizes S-band frequency (2-4 GHZ), 
resulting in a very narrow beamwidth (around 1-2°), so that it minimizes SOJ 
effectiveness within its main beam response. The E-2C uses a lower frequency (around 
400 to 450 MHZ, within the UHF-band), resulting in a wider beamwidth (about 6.5°) and 
a larger impact from the SOJ than that experienced by the E-3A. The E-3A also uses a 
ULSA antenna to further minimize the impact of SOJ. 
If the E-3A encounters hostile jamming, it will have about a 2° strobe on 
the PPI, due to mainlobe jamming, while the E-2C will probably have a 20° strobe on its 
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PPI. Narrower beamwidth is not only good for discriminating targets in close formation 
(higher azimuth resolution), but also minimizes the blanking effect (opening a corridor) 
from main beam jamming. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. AEW SYSTEM VULNERABILITY 
According to the simulation results, an AEW system's detection range is highly 
subject to hostile jamming, especially in the presence of cooperative jamming. Table 7 
shows how vulnerable the AEW system is in a minor, moderate, and severe jamming 
environment and the reductions in detection range experienced in such environments. 
T bl 7 V I bTt f AEWS t a e . u nera 1 Hy o an iys em to EA . 
Minor Jamming Moderate Jamming Severe Jamming 
Number of Jammers I 3 5 (SSJxl:"SOJx4) 
Jamming Mode SOJ SOJ SSJ + SOJ 
Jamming Mode Barrage Jamming Spot Jamming Spot Jamming 
B1=50MHZ B1=20MHZ B1=7.5 MHZ 
Jamming Range 70nmi 50nmi 30nmi 
Jamming Power 1,500 W xI 1,500W x 3 1,500 W x 4 (SOJ) 
200 w X I (SSJ) 
Swerling Type 1 1 1 
Detection Range 242.17 nmi 242.17 nmi 242.17 nmi 
(no jamming) 
Degraded Detection Range I53.79 nmi 'W.84nmi 13.61 nmi 
(due to jamming) 
Reduction in Detection Range 36.5% 66.62% 94.38% 
In the worst jamming environment, the AEW system loses over 94% of the 
detection range to hostile noise jamming. This allows the AEW system to detect only 
targets that are within 13.61 nmi. In moderate jamming conditions a 66.62% reduction in 
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detection range has occurred. This reduction could be 'exploited by the intruding strike 
force as they attempt to evade detection. The AEW system suffers a loss of around 
36.5% ( -88.38 nrni) in an environment that includes only minor jamming. If the SOJ 
jammer is within the AEW system's mainlobe, the detection range will be further reduced 
to 3.58 nmi in the jammer's direction. 
The AEW system is supposed to provide early warning intelligence to the theater 
air operations commands, ground-controlled intercept (GCI) units and friendly forces 
(CAP and SAM sites). If the AEW system's detection capability is degraded 
substantially by hostile noise jamming, the follow-on operation would be jegpardized 
when the AEW system's performance is no longer as good as it should be and the system 
cannot perform its designated function in the manner expected. 
From the susceptibility and vulnerability point of view (based on the sensitivity 
analysis in Table 5), the crucial factors related to the AEW systems detection range are 
the radar's ERP and effective sidelobe level and the jammer's ERP, stand-off range, 
bandwidth, and the number of jammers. The last two factors (B1 and the number of 
jammers) are determined by the invader so that the remaining factors are related to the 
AEW system, which is under the control of the defender. Special efforts must be made to 
improve the AEW system's sidelobe suppression effectiveness (lower sidelobe gain as 
much as possible). The E-3A radar uses an ultra-low sidelobe slotted waveguide array to 
achieve low sidelobe control. 
As a result of the limited payload of airborne radars and other current 
technological restraints, increasing radar transmitted ERP has only limited potential for 
upgrading performance, so the best solution for maintaining AEW system detection 
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capability against hostile jamming, EMI, and ground clutter is to utilize an ultra-low 
sidelobe antenna while providing a sufficient number of sidelobe cancellers. 
Table 8 shows that sidelobe gain is a significant parameter in determining the 
AEW system's detection range in the presence of jamming. The E-3A takes advantage of 
an ultra-low sidelobe antenna that possesses very good immunity from EA. 
a e . 1 eo e am·· T bl 8 s·d I b G . c om fEtli f ec 1veness . 11ariSOD 0 
GsL=-5.5 dBi GsL=-15.5 dBi GsL=-30 dBi 
(Ordinary sidelobe (Low sidelobe (Ultra-low sidelobe 
antenna) antenna) antenna) 
One SOJ Jammer 46.04 nmi 81.79 nmi +75.56 nmi 
Three SOJ Jammers 34.99 nmi 62.21 nmi 139.89 nmi 
Four SOJ Jammers 32.56 nmi 57.89 nmi 131.03 nmi 
In this thesis, the conclusion is drawn that the hypothetical AEW system 
encountering hostile stand-off noise jamming results in curtailed detection range. The 
simulation model generates evidence that adequate EP should be available to ensure that 
the AEW system can survive in the presence of severe jamming and still provide 
acceptable detection range in fulfilling the early warning function. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The simulation model utilized in this thesis suffered from the difficulty in 
obtaining all the necessary data to identify input parameters. More interesting 
conclusions might be possible in the areas of SOJ jamming against the AEW system 
through specified azimuthal angles, and mixed power situations at different altitudes and 
elevation angles if such data were more readily available. 
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Further study should focus on enhancing the simulation program so that it can 
deal with sophisticated jamming environments and the effects of sidelobe cancellers 
(SLC) and sidelobe blankers (SLB) to filter out false target generating (low duty-cycle 
noise jamming) and high duty-cycle CW noise jamming. Further research could help to 
determine how to integrate these two types of EP systems and more fully exploit ultra-
low sidelobe antenna (ULSA). 
52 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Edde, Byron, Radar Principles, Technology, Applications, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993. 
Morchin, William C., Airborne Early Warning Radar, Artech House, Inc., 1990. 
ap Rhys, T. and Andrews, G., "AEW Radar Antennas", AGARD Conference Reprint No. 
139, Antennas for Avionics, 1974. 
Schleher, D.C., Introduction to Electronic Waifare, Artech House, Inc., 1986. 
Stimson, George W., Introduction to Airborne Radar, Hughes Aircraft Co., 1983. 
US Air Force, "E-3 Sentry (AWACS)", USAF Fact Sheet 92-59, Published via Internet, 
1992. 




Chrzanowski, Edward J., Active Radar Electronic Countermeasures, Artech House, Inc., 
1990. 
Farina, Alfonso, Antenna-Based Signal Processing Techniques for Radar Systems, Artech 
House, Inc., 1992. 
Neri, Filippo, Introduction to Electronic Defense Systems, Artech House, Inc., 1991. 
Thomas, DD, Krebs, C.K., Radar, ECM and ECCM Fundamentals, USAFf A WC, 1987. 
Winnefeld, James A., Niblack, Preston, and Johnson, Dana J., A League of Airmen- US Air 
Power in the Gulf War, Rand, 1994. 
55 
56 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
No. Copies 
1. Defense Technical Information Center ......................................................................... 2 
8725 John J Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library .................................................................................................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Chairman, Code PH/Cw ................................................................................................ 1 
Department of Applied Physics 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
4. Professor D.C. Schieber, Code EW/Sc ......................................................................... 1 
Department of Electronic Warfare 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
5. Professor James V. Sanders, Code PH/Sd ..................................................................... 1 
Department of Physics 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
6. Chih-Cheng, Lo .................................................... ; ........................................................ 2 
#7, Alley 26, Lane 644, Chung Shan Rd. Sec 2 
Chang Hua, Taiwan;·ROC 
57 
